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Introduction
This lecture was established to honor the memory of Judge Sumner
Canary.1 Judge Canary spent a good deal of his time in the state court
system. He was also United States Attorney,2 so he spent some time in
the federal system. I have something in common with Judge Canary, in
that I too have served in both systems. I currently serve on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but before that I had the
honor of being a Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court. That is what
I want to talk to you about today.
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in state courts and
their relationship to their federal counterparts. For example, my
colleague on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Jeff Sutton, has
recently published an excellent book on state constitutional law
entitled, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American
Constitutional Law.3 His book, which I will discuss in more detail later,
argues that state courts play a critical, though underappreciated, role
in our national judicial system. I just learned today that he will be here
later this academic year to discuss the book. It is an excellent book.
But I will also offer a bit of a dissent in advance, so when Judge Sutton
comes here, you can ask him what he thinks about my partial dissent.

†

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

1.

The Sumner Canary Memorial Lecture, Case W. Res. Univ., https://
law.case.edu/Academics/Centers-and-Institutes/Center-for-Business-Lawand-Regulation/Sumner-Canary-Lecture [https://perma.cc/2THZ-G8T2]
(last visited Mar. 27, 2019) (Judge Larsen’s Sumner Canary Memorial
Lecture was delivered at the Case Western Reserve School of Law on Sept.
25, 2018).

2.

Id.

3.

Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the
Making of American Constitutional Law (2018).
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With those things in mind, I would like to offer some of my
perspectives on the relationship between state and federal courts. I
thought I would first tell you a little bit about my transition from the
state bench to the federal bench and some things I noticed right away.
Next, I would like to comment on the importance of state courts in our
federal system and the important ways in which they can operate to
improve justice in America. I will also offer a few thoughts about their
limits. Lastly, I will wrap up with a few thoughts about how my
experience as a state court judge has influenced the way I do my current
job as a federal appellate judge.

Part I
First, let me share a bit about my transition from state to federal
court. I am often asked: what are the differences between serving as a
Justice on a state’s highest court and serving in the federal system as a
mere intermediate appellate court judge? Before I begin, I should say
that, of course, I can only speak of my own experience. Someone that
serves on a different court, the Ohio Supreme Court, or any other,
might have a different view. But from my experience, I noticed three
things right away.
The first thing I noticed is that it is an election year, and I am not
on the ballot. In Michigan, as in Ohio, we elect our judges, although
the Governor holds the power to appoint judges to fill vacancies that
arise between elections.4 That was my situation. I was appointed to the
Michigan Supreme Court in the fall of 2015 to fill a vacancy. Under the
Michigan Constitution, a judge appointed to fill a vacancy must stand
in the next state-wide general election.5 For me, that election was in
the fall of 2016 and I am delighted to say that I won my first—and
last—election for public office.
So for starters, there are often differences in how one gets a seat on
a state court as opposed to a federal court. Almost half the states use
some form of election to select their high court justices.6 Obviously, the
federal selection process, consisting of nomination and Senate
confirmation, is quite different. I cannot comment on current
controversies, so I will not dwell long on this subject. I will pause only
long enough to note two things. First, there must be some form of
democratic input in the process of selecting our least majoritarian
branch of government. And second, there will always be disagreement
over what form that democratic input should take—whether that be
election or appointment, and within those broad categories, just
4.

See Mich. Const. art. VI, §§ 2, 23; see also Ohio Const. art. IV, § 6.

5.

Mich. Const. art. VI, § 23.

6.

See Methods of Judicial Selection, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts., http://
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judge
s.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/X9CC-9FNL] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
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precisely what the details ought to be (contested elections, retention
elections, confirmation processes, or the like). There is no perfect
solution to the problem of selecting who will sit in judgment of our
laws, our leaders, and ourselves. We can only ask that the process be
transparent and that the process be fair.
Having been appointed and confirmed through the federal selection
system, one of the first things I noticed when I arrived at the federal
court of appeals is that my colleagues are really far away, and they
change all the time. The judges of the Sixth Circuit, which comprises
the states of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan, are
geographically dispersed. We have our chambers in our home states
(and often in different cities within those states) and come together
only to hear oral argument in Cincinnati. And when we go to
Cincinnati, we sit in rotating, randomly-selected three-judge panels.
The first of these features (geographic dispersion) is not a feature
of all federal appellate courts—the D.C. and Federal Circuits are
notable exceptions—but it is a feature of most of them. And it affects
the way the court operates more than I had anticipated. Before I came
to the Sixth Circuit, I had some form of experience inside three courts:
I had been a law clerk on the D.C. Circuit; a law clerk on the United
States Supreme Court; and then a Justice of the Michigan Supreme
Court. And what all those courts have in common is proximity. The
judges and the law clerks are regularly in one building.
Some say that familiarity breeds contempt, but that was not my
experience. I found it incredibly useful as a law clerk to be able to walk
down the hall and puzzle through a tricky legal question with clerks
from other chambers who were working on the same case. Our work
was hard, and we were fresh out of law school. Having the benefit of
those different perspectives helped me help my judge. And that was
made easier because we were physically together. As a justice of the
Michigan Supreme Court, I found this equally true. My work was made
better by the chance to discuss hard problems with my colleagues faceto-face and one-on-one.
Before I arrived at the Sixth Circuit, I was concerned that
geographical dispersion might hamper the judges’ ability to have
meaningful discussions about legal topics. But I have been pleasantly
surprised by the willingness of my colleagues to discuss cases. Although
I am new to the court, my colleagues have been very welcoming, and
we all seem to get along quite well. But our distance from one another
does present challenges. It means that we have to make more of an
effort to keep open those lines of communication. We cannot discuss a
case in the hallway or over coffee or lunch because we are not together.
So our communication often must take a more formal tone. We
exchange memos, write emails, or pick up the phone. But there is a
little barrier when you cannot just walk down the hall. You have to
think more precisely about what you are going to say. I cannot decide
if that is a benefit or a detriment. Obviously, it is always good to think
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carefully about what you are going to say next. And having to pick up
the phone, write an email, or send a memo produces that result. But
on the other hand, those casual one-on-one interactions often gave me
some of my best ideas. There is not much we can do about geographic
dispersion. It is a feature of appellate courts that cross state lines, and
it has its costs. But it also has the benefit of bringing together a group
of judges with diverse backgrounds, reflecting the legal communities of
the various states that make up our circuit.
A different, but related, way in which the federal courts of appeal
differ from their state counterparts is that the panels, by design, are
constantly changing. When we go to Cincinnati to hear arguments, we
typically hear arguments over four days. And in the course of those four
days, we will sit on two different panels. That means that in any given
court week, I will sit with four different judges; and the next month it
will be a different four; and so on. The process of drawing judges is
random, so sometimes there are repeat players, which means that it
could take many months, or even years, before I will have served on a
panel—even once—with each of my judicial colleagues.
By contrast, supreme courts—state and federal—always sit en
banc. And what that means, as a judge, is that you quickly get to know
your colleagues, both as jurists and as people. That facilitates the
exchange of ideas, not only in the informal way occasioned by proximity
that I mentioned before, but also in the sense that when you sit together
repeatedly, you learn what to expect. Different judges have different
styles for argument and opinion writing. Some judges, for example, like
to ask the first question, and others the last. Figuring out how to insert
oneself into the argument and to adapt one’s own style to facilitate
conversation is easier in a court that convenes with the same five, seven,
or nine actors each time.
The last thing that I noticed instantly upon arriving at the Sixth
Circuit is the difference in the docket. In federal appellate courts, appeal
is by right. That means that our court resolves every case that is
presented to us—from the most jurisprudentially significant cases that
will establish precedent for years to come, to cases in which the law is
largely settled and, so the dispute, while incredibly important to the
parties before the court, will not likely make a lasting mark on the
fabric of the law. By contrast, on the Michigan Supreme Court, as with
the United States Supreme Court and many state high courts, appeals
are by leave only. And so, the judges not only have to decide the cases
before them, but they also have to decide what to decide. That work
occupied a great deal of our time.
As with any court that has a discretionary docket, broader
considerations come into play when deciding which cases to hear. We
would think about things like: whether the legal question at issue was
unsettled in our state; whether we could clarify an area of the law that
had caused problems throughout the state; or whether new legislation
might have affected some of our old rulings. Put simply, on the
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Michigan Supreme Court, we could not fix every error that came our
way. We had to focus on the cases that presented broader issues that
would affect the state as a whole.
As a result, the cases we heard on the Michigan Supreme Court
almost always presented a legal puzzle. If we had decided to hear a
case, it was generally because something about the law needed
correction or clarification. On the Sixth Circuit, we also get cases that
are legally challenging—plenty of them. But we also hear cases that
present no legal mysteries. These cases might not be legally challenging,
but they are nonetheless hard in that they involve the painstaking work
of reading through a record to make sure that the district court, or the
agency, or whoever the initial decisionmaker was below, got the case
right by appropriately applying the facts within the confines of a legal
regime that is largely settled. These are not always the most glamorous
cases. But to the people and the entities involved, they are just as
important. It matters a lot in the real world—to the claimant and to
the taxpayer—whether, for example, Mrs. Smith was wrongfully denied
disability benefits. It also matters a lot in the real world—to the
defendant, to law enforcement, and to the citizenry—whether there was
probable cause to support Mr. Jones’s arrest. So on the federal appellate
court, it is our job to fix every error. That is a different role, and it is
not one that is less important, than the role of a state’s high court.
For better or worse, the federal courts seemed to have captured
more of the public’s imagination than their state counterparts. And, of
course, what we do matters a great deal. Because the United States
Supreme Court hears so few cases, the federal courts of appeal are the
courts of last resort for most federal litigants. But I am not sure whether
as many people appreciate the significance of state supreme courts.
These courts not only shape and form the common law, but they also
bear the truly tremendous responsibility of being the final say on the
interpretation of state statutes and state constitutions. And it is this
work that I want to discuss next.

Part II
So why does the day-to-day work of state courts matter? It seems
like most media coverage is of the federal courts, and in particular, the
United State Supreme Court. Why should we pay attention to the work
of state courts?
The first reason is that state courts directly affect people’s lives.
Judge Sutton noted in his recent book that “by one count, 95 percent
of the disputes resolved by courts in this country are filed in the state
courts, as opposed to the federal.”7 That count makes sense because the
kinds of disputes that ordinary people might have with one another
typically sound in tort, contract, or real property—quintessential state
7.

Sutton, supra note 3, at 184.
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law topics. Moreover, most criminal law, and nearly all family law, are
still the province of the states. To the extent that these subjects are
common law subjects, the state courts are the law-developers (even if
the cases end up being tried in federal court); to the extent that
legislatures have a hand in these areas, state legislatures, not Congress,
are the dominant players, the expansion of the Commerce Clause
notwithstanding. And state courts, of course, have the final say on the
interpretation of state legislative acts. So just in terms of sheer volume,
state courts are where the action is.
Judge Sutton’s new book points out another way in which state
courts matter—they can be “innovators” or “dissenters” from the
federal regime.8 This is true in a few ways. One is that, often, state law
need not conform to federal law. Judge Sutton focused his attention on
state constitutional law, and I will say a few words about that. But
there are other ways in which state courts need not follow in lock step
with their federal brethren, even when confronting similar problems.
State courts can thus “dissent” from the federal model and perhaps
provide useful experience to inform a larger discussion.
One example that comes to mind concerns Chevron deference.9 Of
course, the underlying dispute over Chevron deference is whether, and
how much, it is appropriate for the judiciary to defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of the law and whether giving
such deference impermissibly divests courts of the judicial power.10
Much has been said recently on this topic, and I am not here to enter
the fray. But I note that this is an area in which some state courts have
gone another way. That includes Michigan. In a case called In re
Complaint of Rovas against SBC Michigan,11 the Michigan Supreme
Court held that agency interpretations of statutes were entitled to
“respectful consideration,” but that courts still retained the primary
responsibility for interpreting statutes according to their plain
language.12 As a result, Michigan courts are untethered from an
administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute and instead conduct
de novo review of the statutory interpretation questions presented to
them. And a recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court suggested that
Ohio’s high court is likewise interested in the question whether state

8.

Id. at 21.

9.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

10.

See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).

11.

754 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. 2008).

12.

Id. at 262.
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agencies should be given Chevron-type deference for their
interpretations of the law.13
The point is not to praise or condemn Chevron deference. Instead,
my point here is that there are all sorts of ways in which state courts
may accept, reject, or tinker with federal doctrine. And this might
provide data to, and inform a larger national discussion about, an
important legal topic.
As I mentioned at the outset, there has lately been renewed interest
in the states as laboratories of constitutional law. Judge Sutton’s book
on this topic, 51 Imperfect Solutions, is an excellent look at the history
of state constitutional law and offers a superb discussion of some of the
events that have kept state courts from developing the constitutional
law of their states. The book also offers some intriguing ideas about
what courts and litigants might do going forward to give state
constitutions their own meaning, distinct from the federal Constitution.
I cannot think of a better author for such a book than Judge Sutton,
who has served over fifteen years as a federal appellate court judge and
who previously served as Solicitor General of Ohio. His experience, as
a federal judge and a state court litigator, makes him eminently
qualified to speak on this topic.
For those who have not had an opportunity to read the book, it is
an in-depth exploration of the role of state constitutional law in our
nation’s constitutional history. He explains how states have set both
negative and positive examples that have affected the development of
constitutional law. The book does this by exploring four specific areas
of the law: school funding, the exclusionary rule, compelled sterilization,
and mandatory flag salutes. It then offers thoughts about how state
constitutional law might be taken more seriously, focusing on what
judges, attorneys, state bars, and law schools can do to give state
constitutional law a more prominent voice in the discussion of
individual constitutional rights. Judge Sutton believes that “an
underappreciation of state constitutional law has hurt state and federal
law and has undermined the appropriate balance between state and
federal courts in protecting individual liberty.”14 Judge Sutton raises
many thought-provoking points: too many to address in this lecture.
But I thought I would share a few thoughts in response to some of his
ideas about the future of state constitutional law.
Judge Sutton’s book is, in large part, a quest to figure out why
state constitutions do not receive as much attention as their federal
counterpart and what can be done to correct that—to encourage
litigators to include the state constitutions as part of their litigation
strategy, and perhaps a source of rights protection for individuals. Early
13.

State ex rel. McCann v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Elections, 118 N.E.3d 224, 231
(Ohio 2018) (DeWine, J., concurring); id. at 234 n.2 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).

14.

Sutton, supra note 3, at 6 (emphasis omitted).
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in his book, Judge Sutton states that if the reader doubts the conclusion
that state constitutions have taken a back seat to the federal
Constitution, he or she should “[a]sk a state court judge about the
frequency with which claimants raise federal and state constitutional
challenges to state or local laws and the seriousness with which they
raise the state claims (if they raise them at all).”15
I am that judge. During my time on the Michigan Supreme Court,
arguments that the Michigan Constitution protected different rights or
protected the same rights differently than the United States
Constitution were few and far between. On the rare occasions in which
such arguments were raised, they usually amounted to little more than
throw-away arguments. Counsel might end a brief or argument by
saying, essentially: “In conclusion, if you find that the federal
Constitution does not require this, then you should find that the state
Constitution does.” End of argument.
This was somewhat surprising, as the Michigan Supreme Court has
a history of showing some willingness to rule solely under its state
Constitution. The most well-known example is a case called Sitz v.
Department of State Police.16 There, the Michigan Court of Appeals
held that sobriety checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.17 The Michigan Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal that decision, which meant that the intermediate
appellate court ruling remained in place.18 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed, ruling that the checkpoints did
not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.19
On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in what some perceived as
a bold move for an intermediate appellate court, held that although the
sobriety checkpoints may have been permitted by the United States
Constitution, they nevertheless violated the analogous search and
seizure prohibition in the Michigan Constitution.20 The Michigan
Supreme Court later affirmed that decision.21
Sitz does not mark the only time the Michigan Supreme Court has
held that the Michigan Constitution provides broader protection than
its federal counterpart. In a case called County of Wayne v. Hathcock,22
15.

Id. at 9.

16.

429 N.W.2d 180 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Mich. Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), aff’d sub nom. Sitz v. Dep’t of
State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Mich. 1993).

17.

Id. at 185.

18.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448.

19.

Id. at 455.

20.

Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).

21.

Sitz, 506 N.W.2d at 210.

22.

684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
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the Michigan Supreme Court addressed a question that would come
before the United States Supreme Court the very next year.23 The
United States Supreme Court case, with which many of you may be
familiar, was Kelo v. City of New London.24 In that case, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution did not prohibit a state from using its power of eminent
domain to take private property from one individual and give it to
another pursuant to an economic “redevelopment plan.”25 The
redevelopment plan in that case was to take people’s homes in one area
of the city in order to allow other private parties to put the land to
“commercial, residential and recreational uses” that would perhaps
revitalize the area.26 The United States Supreme Court held that the
redevelopment plans constituted a “public use” for purposes of the
Takings Clause.27
Just one year earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court had confronted
the same issue under its own constitution and had come to the opposite
conclusion. Condemning private homes in order to allow other private
entities to build a “large business and technology park with a conference
center, hotel accommodations, and a recreational facility” was not,
according to the Michigan Supreme Court, a “public use.”28 The United
States Supreme Court took note of the Hathcock decision when it
decided Kelo but was not persuaded.29 It did, however, emphasize the
role that state constitutions could play in providing greater protections
for the property rights of its citizens.30
Despite this apparent willingness on the part of the Michigan
Supreme Court to consider arguments that the state Constitution
provides more, or different, protection than its federal counterpart,
meaningful arguments to that effect were nearly nonexistent during my
time on that court. And as Judge Sutton points out, failing to argue for
rights protection on both state and federal constitutional grounds might
be a serious disservice to one’s client, who could be forfeiting an avenue
to victory.31
Yet, I also want to dissent a bit from an implicit charge that might
flow from this exploration of the possibilities of state constitutional law.
That is the charge that state supreme court justices, as a whole, might
23.

Id.

24.

545 U.S. 469 (2005).

25.

Id. at 488–90 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V).

26.

Id. at 483–85.

27.

Id. at 489–90.

28.

Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770–71, 788.

29.

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n.22.

30.

Id. at 489.

31.

Sutton, supra note 3, at 19.
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not have done enough in the way of what Judge Sutton calls “rightsinnovating.”32 And here I should make clear that Judge Sutton himself
does not levy this charge or take a position on this topic.
To introduce this idea, I should state what you likely already know:
state constitutions can only grant rights more generous than those
protected by the federal Constitution.33 Since the late 1960’s, by which
time the Supreme Court had largely completed the task of incorporating
most Bill of Rights protections against the states,34 federal rights
guarantees have pre-empted any less-generous state analogue.35 So any
work to be done by state constitutions in the area of individual rights
would have to consist of granting protections where the federal
Constitution might be thought to fall short. That is likely why Judge
Sutton refers to state constitutions, and their state judicial interpreters,
as having the potential to be “rights innovators.”36
But, even presuming that there are areas in which the federal
Constitution could use some assistance, it is not clear to me that it is
appropriate for state judiciaries, as opposed to other institutions, to be
the primary innovators. Certainly, judges must take seriously any state
constitutional challenge that is brought before the court and must
consider the real possibility that their state charter might grant broader
protections than are afforded by existing interpretations of the federal
and state constitutions. But, at the same time, I do not believe Judge
Sutton to be advocating that state judges invent more extensive rights
from thin air.
That, then, puts front and center the question of interpretive
method. To make the question a little more concrete, I ask myself: what
tools would I have used as a Michigan Supreme Court Justice to figure
out whether a litigant was entitled to additional protections under the
Michigan Constitution? What legal sources would I have looked to? If
we want judges to deploy the traditional tools of constitutional
interpretation—the big three being text, history, and precedent—then
we have to ask ourselves first, how available these sources will be as
they pertain exclusively to state constitutional law, and second, how
likely they will be to yield an answer that is both different and more
generous than the analogous federal constitutional right.
Sometimes, of course, the text will just be different; there are
written provisions in many state constitutions that have no federal
analogue. Some state constitutions, for example, contain “single

32.

Id. at 21.

33.

See id. at 14–15, 63.

34.

See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 763–66 (2010).

35.

Sutton, supra note 3, at 12–15.

36.

Id. at 19.
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subject” rules.37 Some grant affirmative rights that are not textually
guaranteed by the federal Constitution—the right to education being a
prominent example.38 But often, state rights mirror federal rights—or
in older states, it is the other way around, as federal Bill of Rights
protections were often modeled on the rights protected in the preexisting state constitutions.39 So, if a state judge is faced with a text
that replicates, or closely tracks, the text of the federal constitutional
right, she must ask herself: what are the chances that this language
means something different? It might, of course. But if we are talking
about a cognate provision—particularly one worded nearly identically
or using a legal term of art (i.e. ex post facto)—then there is a decent
argument that when the federal Constitution borrowed the phrase from
the state constitution, or vice versa, the drafters and ratifiers of the
borrowing constitution would have understood the provision to have
the meaning that it had in the original document. That is likely why
the constitution used a borrowed term, instead of saying something
different. And if that is right, we would not expect to see divergence in
state and federal constitutional meaning.
Of course, it could be that the provisions shared the same original
meaning, but the judges of one court or another later strayed from that
meaning in the course of deciding cases. If the federal judges were the
ones to stray, then we might see room for state courts to correct the
error. But, of course, state courts can only correct errors that fall in one
direction; they can only be more generous than the federal
constitutional right. And here I am a little bit skeptical that there are
many state constitutional rights that are being under-enforced relative
to both their original meaning and to the interpretation given to their
federal cognates. That is because, as Judge Sutton explains in his book,
it was “the States’ relative under-protection of individual rights” that
lead the Supreme Court to incorporate the federal bill of rights against
the states in the first place.40
There are exceptions, of course. The example of the Hathcock and
Kelo cases I just mentioned is a good one. There, the Michigan Supreme
Court interpreted the phrase “public use” according to its original
public meaning in the Michigan Constitution and concluded that its
meaning was narrower than the one the United States Supreme Court
would ascribe to its federal counterpart the next year in Kelo. But I am
not sure how often a similar pattern will obtain.
What if you do not buy the premise of the argument I have just
outlined? What if you think that judges ought not limit themselves to
the traditional tools of constitutional interpretation but instead should
37.

See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. IV, § 24.

38.

See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2.

39.

See Sutton, supra note 3, at 8.

40.

Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
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seek to infuse the constitution with contemporary meaning? That is a
viewpoint popular among some judges, law students, and members of
the academy when it comes to interpreting the federal Constitution.
But that view rests largely on two pillars that are not always, or
perhaps even often, found in state constitutions, as opposed to their
federal counterpart. The first of these pillars is that constitutions are
old; and the second is that they are nearly impossible to amend through
democratic processes.
As to the first, yes, some state constitutions are old. As mentioned
previously, the federal Constitution borrowed most of the Bill of Rights
from rights protected in the state constitutions that pre-dated it.41 And
a few of those state constitutions still govern their citizens today.
Massachusetts, for example, is still governed by its Constitution of
1780.42 Scholars have claimed that the document is the “oldest
functioning written constitution in the world.”43 But, of course, that is
not the condition of all our states. Both Alaska and Hawaii came into
the Union only in 1959,44 and Hawaii governs under a Constitution
adopted in convention even more recently, in 1978.45 Other states too
have adopted new constitutions in conventions of relatively recent
vintage. Michigan, for example, although granted statehood in 1837,
has remade its Constitution several times, most recently in 1963.46
Georgia’s Constitution of 198347 is one of the nation’s youngest
constitutions, even though Georgia was the fourth state admitted to
the Union.48 Although by no means exhaustive, these few examples
illustrate that at least some state constitutions are both younger and
easier to amend than the federal Constitution.
Indeed, in nearly half the states, including Michigan and Ohio, the
people themselves can play a direct role in amending their state
41.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

42.

See Wheatley v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 792 N.E.2d 645, 648 (Mass.
2008); see also S.B. Benjamin, The Significance of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 883, 884 n.5 (1997).

43.

Lawrence M. Friedman & Lynnea Thody, The Massachusetts
State Constitution 3 (2011).

44.

Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (establishing Alaska as
a state); Act of Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (establishing Hawaii
as a state).

45.

See State ex rel. Anzai v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 57 P.3d 433, 435–36
(Haw. 2002).

46.

See People v. Nutt, 677 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Mich. 2004).

47.

Georgia’s latest constitution was ratified in November 1982 but went into
effect on July 1, 1983. See Googe v. Fla. Int’l Indem. Co., 422 S.E.2d 552,
554 n.7 (Ga. 1992); Carpenter v. State, 297 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. 1982).

48.

Andrew Glass, Georgia Enters the Union: Jan. 2, 1788, Politico (Jan.
1, 2017, 11:28 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/georgiaenters-the-union-jan-2-1788-233087 [https://perma.cc/T8KA-82SJ].
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constitutions through the initiative process.49 This means that if the
citizens of such a state are unhappy with the rights or protections
provided by their constitution, they have a direct means to change it.
You are probably familiar with the many significant measures that have
recently been added to Ohio’s constitution through initiative, including
provisions regarding minimum wages, crime victims’ rights, and
redistricting.50 My state too has used this form of direct democracy to
amend its constitution in significant ways.51 I am not here to take a
position on these initiatives or even to comment on the merits of direct
democracy as a form of constitutional amendment. I only note that
when thinking about how judges should interpret a state constitution,
one needs to consider the whole landscape. Even if one adheres to the
so-called “living Constitution” school of thought when it comes to
interpreting the United States Constitution, it does not plainly follow
that the approach is suited to the interpretation of state constitutions,
which may be both younger and more amenable to democratic change.

Conclusion
I thought I would conclude with some thoughts about how my time
serving on a state court has influenced my thinking about the role of a
federal judge. It probably comes as no surprise that my state court
experience comes into play most often when we are exercising
supplemental or diversity jurisdiction and, therefore, applying state law
in federal court. Serving on a state court has heightened my
appreciation of and respect for the ways in which each states’ law may
differ. When applying state law under supplemental or diversity
jurisdiction, a federal judge should be careful not to step on the toes of
another sovereign.
There are a few ways that a federal judge can exercise caution when
reviewing state law. The first is just to try to get a handle on the
nuances of state law. There is sometimes a tendency in the legal
profession to think of “the common law” as a monolith. That is more
or less how we teach the common law in law school. Your torts book,
for example, probably included a collection of cases on discrete topics—
say, for example, proximate cause or premises liability—that were
pulled from a variety of jurisdictions. They were chosen by the casebook
editor or your professor because they illustrated a concept and maybe
because their facts were memorable. But in most law schools these days,
49.

Initiative and Referendum States, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-theinitiative-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/988F-UBAY] (last visited Feb. 4,
2019).

50.

See Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a (minimum wage); id. art. I, § 10a (crime
victims’ rights); id. art. XI (congressional redistricting).

51.

See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. I, § 26 (affirmative action restriction).
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you likely were not taught the particular tort law of Ohio, Michigan,
or Tennessee. Instead, you learned basic ideas about tort law, and you
probably did not pay that much attention to where the cases came
from. That is how I learned torts anyway. And that is probably the
way we need to teach law in a legal climate that is mobile and
increasingly national. We need to teach the broad concepts and let
practitioners learn the nuances as they settle into a locality.
The trick as a federal judge, who deals with the law of many states,
is not to forget that there likely are nuances to learn. I think my
experience serving on a state court has made me more sensitive to the
need to understand the subtleties of the various states’ law. Of course,
I will not always get it right. But I do think that my experience on the
state court has made me more attentive to the search for details than
I might have been otherwise.
This is also a good thing to remember for those of you in the
audience who are litigators or would-be litigators. The lawyers who
regularly practice in a state are often our best guides to those nuances
of state law. So, as a litigator who may practice both in state and federal
court, please do not assume that the federal judges will already be
familiar with the unique aspects of the governing law in your state.
Please use your experience and expertise to educate us and help us do
our jobs.
Sometimes, of course, state law will be truly unsettled. When
federal courts encounter an unresolved area of state law, they need to
be particularly careful. After all, state courts should have the primary
responsibility for deciding questions of state law. There are a few
solutions to the problem of unsettled state law. The first is the
certification process. The Supreme Court has encouraged certification
when federal courts are faced with novel state law questions, noting
that certification puts the state law question “directly to the State’s
highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the
assurance of gaining an authoritative response.”52 Another reason in
support of certification is that it “helps build a cooperative judicial
federalism.”53 Certification allows the federal courts to respect the
state’s ability to interpret and control its own state law, permitting
those sitting on the state’s highest court, who presumably have the best
understanding of the law within their state, to address new legal
questions first.54
Certification, however, is not without its own wrinkles. First of all,
it may slow things down. Secondly, some states are unwilling or unable
to answer certified questions. For example, there is a dispute on the
Michigan Supreme Court about whether the Michigan Constitution
52.

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997).
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Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1974).
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permits it to answer certified questions from federal courts.55 But to the
extent the certification procedure is available, it seems to me that we
should be amenable to using it in order to respect the rights and abilities
of the states to control the interpretation of their own laws.56
When certification is not available or practical, a federal court may
have to determine, on its own, what a state court would do when faced
with an unanswered legal question. If we have to do that, the Sixth
Circuit caselaw says that we “must make the best prediction, even in
the absence of direct state precedent, of what the [state’s highest court]
would do if it were confronted with [that] question.”57 Here, we need to
be careful. We need to make sure that we are stepping into the shoes
of the state’s highest court, rather than stepping on its toes. If we
incorrectly predict the result could be that we have a law of Ohio that
obtains in federal court and a law of Ohio that obtains in state court.
The litigators among you know that that will lead to rampant forum
shopping—at least until the matter is brought back to our attention so
we can bring the question in line with state court decisions.
Reviewing state law as a federal judge is inevitable. But exercising
caution, whether that be by certifying the truly unsettled questions to
the state court, or just by paying attention to the nuances of state law,
federal judges can respect the rights of the state courts, as independent
sovereigns, to interpret their own laws in accordance with the
constitutional design.
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See, e.g., In re Certified Question from U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 885 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Mich. 2016) (Young, C.J.,
concurring); In re Certified Questions from U.S. Court of Appeals for
Sixth Circuit, 696 N.W.2d 687, 687 (Mich. 2005).

56.

See Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 348, 371 (6th Cir.
2018) (Larsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Managed Health Care Assocs., Inc. v.
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